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I. Introduction
I would like to congratulate Professor Ahn and Professor Lee for their thorough and
insightful analysis of economic and institutional factors that contribute to East Asian
economic growth. As emphasized by Professors Ahn and Lee that in addition to the
usual growth fundamentals, trade openness and foreign direct investment have contributed
significantly to the high growth and fluctuations of the East Asian economies in the last
four decade, so are government policies and institutions. They also show that a balance-of-
payment crisis has a strong, negative effect on economic growth and over time East Asian
economies have continuously narrowed their income gap from their long-run potential
levels. In light of their results I shall focus my discussions on the following three areas:
(i) exchange rate and macroeconomic stability; (ii) trade fragmentation and economic
convergence; and (iii) what drives structural reforms?
II. Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Stability
“Collectively stable exchange rates can help national central banks more securely an-
chor their national price levels, smooth business cycle fluctuations”; and “encourage greater
diversification of private asset holdings across countries” (McKinnon (2005)).
IIa. Prominent features of Asian Economy.
Three prominent features of Asian economies since the 1997-1998 financial crises are:
1. The Rise of Intraregional Trade in East Asia. In 1980, about 32 percent of over-
all trade of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand was with each other. By 2002, over 50 percent
of overall trade was intraregional.
2. From debtors to creditors. Most Asian economies are becoming dollar creditors.
By the end of December 2006 or January 2007 the foreign exchange reserves
held by China was US$1.066 trillion. Japan $895 billion, Taiwan, $266 billion,
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Korea $240 billion, Singapore $137 billion, Hong Kong, $134 billion, Thailand $70
billion, Malaysia $88 billion, Indonesia about $35 billion. Their latest 12 month
current account balance as a percentage of GDP are all positive. (Table 1)
3. The use of dollar as international money and the return to dollar-pegged exchange
rate system. Almost all the intraregional trade is invoiced in the U.S. dollars
except when that trade is directly with Japan.
Prior to the 1997-1998 financial crisis the East Asian economies — except for Japan
— either formally or informally pegged their currencies to the US dollar. Despite the push
of IMF for East Asian currencies to float their currencies more freely, by 2003, practically
all the countries have again softly pegged their currencies to the dollar (e.g. McKinnon
(2005)). This may be a reasonable policy choice given forward markets in foreign exchange
remain expensive or poorly developed. Pegging their currencies to the dollar both facilitate
hedging by merchants and banks against exchange rate risk and to help central banks
anchor their domestic price levels (McKinnon (2005)).
IIb. Risks for Dollar denominated economy.
Since neither the debtor country, nor the creditor country can borrow or lend its own
currencies, the risks of “original sin” (Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999)) or “conflicted
virtue” (McKinnon (2005)) for Asian economy could increase.
“Original sin” per Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) is a situation in which the
domestic currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long term, even domes-
tically. In the presence of this incompleteness, financial fragility is unavoidable because
all domestic investments will have either a currency mismatch (e.g. projects that generate
Thai Baht will be financed with dollars) or a maturity mismatch (long-term projects will
be financed by short-term loans).” A currency attack forcing an immediate repayment
of short-term dollar debts to foreigners could precipitate devaluation, leading to the shot
up to the value of the banks’ liabilities relative to their assets, causing massive domestic
bankruptcies, even for firms that are profitable and would have been viable otherwise (e.g.
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Bernanks and Gertler (1989)).
“Conflicted virtue” per McKinnon (2005) is that when an international creditor coun-
try cannot lend in its own currency, with the passage of time, two things happen:
First, “as the stock of dollar claims cumulates, domestic holders of dollar assets worry
more that a self-sustaining run into the domestic currency will force an appreciation.”
Second, “foreigners start complaining that the country’s ongoing flow of trade surpluses
is unfair and results from having an undervalued currency”. Unhedged individual or in-
stitutional holders of dollar assets in creditor economies are at risk should the domestic
currency appreciate. Furthermore, when the world price level measured in U.S. dollars is
quite stable, the exporters could lose mercantile competitiveness when the domestic cur-
rency appreciates, leading to a domestic deflationary spiral. McKinnon and Ohno (2001)
have shown that repeated yen appreciations from the 1980’s to 1995 contributed to Japan’s
deflationary slump in the 1990’s.
On the other hand, policies of sustaining undervalued domestic currencies ultimately
generate unsterilizable increases in foreign currency reserves. Accumulation of excess for-
eign currency reserves distorts domestic financial systems by pushing interest rates below
equilibrium level and causes excess monetary growth, domestic asset price bubbles, over-
heating, inflation and the loss of competitiveness that most governments try to prevent.
It also makes Asian economies excessively depend on demand from outside the region.
IIc. Costs of Financial crisis.
Many Asian economies have fragile financial systems. Problems in financial sectors
could trigger currency crises (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)). Costs associated with
financial crises or balance-of-payment crises are huge. For the year prior to the 1997
financial crises and the year post the crises (1996 vs 1998), the GDP growth for Indonesia
was 8 percent versus -13.1 percent; for Korea was 6.8 percent versus -6.7 percent; for
Malaysia was 10 percent versus -7.4 percent; for Philippines, was 5.8 percent versus -0.6
percent (Table 2). The five worst-hit countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South
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Korea and Thailand are still suffering 10 years after the 1997 financial crisis. Comparing
the period from 1990 - 1996 with 2000 - 2006, the Asian Development Bank finds that their
“growth has settled on a lower trajectory”. It has slipped by an average of 2.5 percentage
points a year. The root of the cause lies in the falling investment rates. It appears that
once business confidence and perception were shakened, it would be difficult to recover.
In addition to the direct economic costs, there are also political and social costs with the
occurrence of financial crisis that are difficult to quantify.
IId. Safeguard mechanism.
Stability of exchange rates promotes trade by reducing transaction cost. Orderly
adjustment of exchange rates can help national central banks more securely anchor their
national price levels and encourage greater diversification of private asset holdings across
countries. However, the East Asian exchange rate system is hardly secure. Misalignment
of exchange rates often trigger currency attacks. The problem is compounded by the
“currency mismatch” and “maturity mismatch”. Moreover, the markets almost always
overreact as can be seen in the fluctuation of exchange rates prior, during and after 1997
financial crises at the bottom part of Table 1. However, the establishment of a “common
Asian currency” is not a reachable goal in the near future given the current disparities in
political structure and diverse stages of development among Asian economies.
Focus probably should be on the establishment of a pool of exchange reserves and
forging institutional rules to ensure smooth adjustment in exchange rates and greater
regional monetary harmonization to facilitate hedging by merchants and banks against
exchange rate risk; and to help central banks anchor their domestic price levels.
III. Fragmentation or Convergence
The robust growth of Asian economic growth is accompanied by an even robust growth
of intraregional trade (Wakasugi (2007)). Intra-East Asian trade increased from 32 per-
cent in 1980 to 60 percent in 2003. China’s imports from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea,
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Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand rose from 6.2 percent of overall im-
ports in 1980 to 40.9 percent in 2001, while China’s exports to these economies as a percent
of overall exports remain about the same. On the other hand, Chinese exports to the U.S.
have risen from 5.4 percent in 1980 to 20.4 percent in 2001.
De jure integration resulsts in a large trade creation effect (e.g. Hiratsuka (2006),
Wakasugi (2007)). Integration of production system in Asian economies is driven by het-
erogeneity in factor endowments and factor prices. But as income grows, presumably
economy will move to higher value-added ladder to sustain the growth. Table 3 provides
the changes of employment in the last two hundred years in the U.S. Today, 82 percent of
140 million U.S. workers are employed in the service sector and less than 10 percent are in
the manufacturing sector. At the end of 2005, the U.S. auto and auto parts manufacturing
industry employed about 1.1 million workers and added 0.8 percent of the value to the
U.S. GDP. The legal services sector employed about the same number but contributed 1.5
percent of the value added to GDP.
The Chinese trade data shows this pattern. In the early 1980’s, Chinese exports
were largely agricultural products, raw materials and basic manufactures. Imports were
dominated by sophisticated manufacturing products such as machinery and transportation
equipment. Today, the percentage of machines, transport equipment, and miscellaneous
manufacturing goods (clothing and accessories, precision instruments, photo and optical
equipment) has risen to about 70 percent of exports and agricultural products and raw ma-
terials have fallen to less than 10 percent. On the other hand, the commodity composition
of imports has changed in the opposite direction. The percentage of raw materials have
risen from about 8 to 18 percent in 2000. The percentage of imports of basic manufacturers
(leather, wood, paper, textile, yarn, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals) have declined from
about 28 to 19 percent (Table 4). However, East Asia has achieved economic integration
only in terms of trade in intermediate goods, not in consumption good and services (e.g.
Hiratsuka (2006)). As people get richer, they shift their spending towards services. For
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every dollar Americans spend on goods, they spend $1.70 on services — roughly a 40-60
percent mix. In contrast, China spends 58 percent on goods versus 42 percent on services.
India spends 63 percent on goods and 37 percent on services, (Fisher (2007)). What do
these shifts away from the goods and lower-value-added sectors to higher valued services
sector mean to the pattern of trade or convergent hypothesis as Asian economies grow?
Will we see trade fragmentation perpetuates disparity in income among Asian economy
or will we see adjustments in factor prices to achieve more equity (e.g. Krugman (2000),
Leamer (1996))?
IV. What Drives Structural Reform?
Ahn and Lee (2007) have shown that government policies and institutions contributed
significantly to the high growth of the East Asian economies. As pointed out by the 2003
World Bank report that East Asian nations were involved “in a continuing process of
reform, adapting policy instruments and institutions — willingness toe experiment and
adapt policies to changing circumstances is a key element in economic success”.
What drives structural reforms? Is reform a continuing process of graduate improve-
ment or crises beget reform? It is sometimes argued that “crises and emergencies may be
welfare-enhancing and hence desirable. When ongoing social conflict implies that an econ-
omy has settled in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium, radical changes are often needed to break
the stalemate and put the economy on a welfare-superior path. ... The extreme welfare
loss that each agent suffers in a crisis dwarfs the loss he may associate with an unfavorable
distribution of the burden of a major policy change.” (Drazen and Grilli (1993)). Tommasi
and Velasco (1996) have argued that “economic crises seem to either facilitate or outright
cause economic reform”, yet Campos, Hsiao and Nugent (2007) find that political consid-
erations (political crises as well as political institutions) are more important determinants.
What are the main drivers of reform? If crises beget reform, what is the benefit and cost
of a reform or a crisis?
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Table 1.  Foreign Exchange Reserves and Current Account Balance as 
a percentage of GDP










Latest 12 month** 
Current Account balance 
as % of GDP
Foreign Exchange* 
Reserve ($Billion)
Table 2.  Macroeconomic Indicators during Balance-of-payment Crisis
4.081.252.943.892.332000 – 2005
6.490.386.136.534.771990 – 1995
























Table 4. Chinese Exports and Imports by 
Commodity (Percent)
5.6440.8118.8817.972.532000
AP = agriculture products, CM = crude materials including fuels, BM = basic 
manufactures, MT = machines and transport equipment, MM = miscellaneous 
manufactured goods.
Source: adapted from Tables 5.2 and 5.3 of McKinnon (2005)
4.5238.9527.957.994.411985
Imports
34.3133.0817.384.934.922000
12.812.8116.4935.6114.921985
Exports
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